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In this paper, we study a set of new indices, which are based on the
answers of citizens to certain batteries of items included in a CSES
module 5 pilot study conducted in Greece after the parliamentary
election of September 2015. The first index is used to capture at-
titudes of citizens towards the political elites and is related to the
increasing number of recent publications focusing on the study of
populist attitudes. Likewise, the second index is based on items re-
lated to a demand for more power to the poor people. Another in-
dex developed here is built to measure attitudes towards out-groups.
The use of this index is motivated by the increasing power of radi-
cal right-wing anti-immigrant parties, especially in Europe and due,
to a certain extent, to the recent immigrant crisis. In addition to
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the aforementioned indices, we also identify the characteristics re-
spondents think to be the most important for someone to be con-
sidered as a ‘Real Greek’, i.e. we present what are the most impor-
tant lines that according to Greek citizens separate the in-group
from the out-groups. After constructing the indices we use them
both as dependent variables to identify the factors facilitating pop-
ulist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes and as independent
variables in a multinomial vote choice model to estimate the im-
pact of these attitudes on voting behavior.
Introductory Remarks
On populism
THE STUDY of populist attitudes has contributed some revealing
research of the populist phenomenon (Hawkins & Riding 2010,
Hawkins,Riding, & Mudde 2012). In addition to populist atti-
tudes, such research has also targeted elitist and pluralist atti-
tudes (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove 2014). Indeed, the rela-
tionship between populism and elitism, or rather anti-elitism,
seems to be crucial in understanding populism. If populism is de-
fined as a worldview that ‘identifies Good with a unified will of
the people and Evil with a conspiring elite’ (Hawkins & Riding
2010), then the antagonism between ‘the people’ and the ‘elite’,
where the former is perceived as ‘good’, ‘pure’ and/or ‘homo-
geneous’ and the latter is regarded as ‘corrupt’ and ‘evil’ acquires
primal importance (Mudde 2007, Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012). 
Yet, a strong association between populism and anti-elitism
is also present in conceptualizations of populism that bracket
the aforementioned moralistic politico-theological framing of
populist anti-elitism. For example, a discourse-oriented approach
to populism is premised on establishing whether a given discur-
sive practice under examination is, first, articulated around the
nodal point ‘the people’ or other non-populist nodal points (na-
tion, class, movement, race, etc.), and, second, to what extent the
representation of society it offers is a predominantly antagonis-
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tic one, dividing the social field between two antagonistic camps:
‘the people’ (the underdog, the non-privileged, the ‘many’, and
so on), on the one side, and the ‘elite’ (the establishment, the
power bloc, and so on), on the other. When these two conditions
are in place at the same time, it is assumed that it is rather safe
to identify a party or a movement as ‘populist’ (Stavrakakis &
Katsambekis 2014).
The discourse analysis of populism has highlighted the im-
portance of interrogating in detail what is ‘the people’ and what
is the hostile ‘elite’ invoked in a discourse categorised as pop-
ulist. This is crucial because it can help us distinguish between
left-wing and right-wing populism (Stavrakakis et al. 2017, De
Cleen & Stavrakakis 2017). In the first case, it could be assumed
that the ‘elite’ would include both professional politicians as well
as the economically privileged, the establishment, the so-called
1%, who, according to the Occupy movement protesters, enjoy a
disproportionate share of wealth. In fact, the emphasis would ar-
guably be placed on the latter. As for the people, they would be,
accordingly, framed in a rather ‘inclusionary’ manner that pri-
oritizes economic and class positioning over national belonging.
In stark opposition to left-wing populism, right-wing variants
would probably target more the political and not the economic
elites, unless the latter are identified as the alien and conspira-
torial forces of globalization that undermine the national econ-
omy. Here, ‘the people’ are also bound to be framed in rather ‘ex-
clusionary’ terms that place outside the body politic foreigners,
immigrants, etc. (Gidron & Bonikowski 2014: 5, Mudde & Rovi-
ra Kaltwasser 2013).
On nationhood
Founded in 1830, the Greek state developed from the 1821-7
revolution against the centuries-long Ottoman rule. This revo-
lution was typical of separatist Eastern nationalist movements
(Breuilly 1982: 107-111). As in other Balkan and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, the nation-state in Greece, as a post-traditional
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mode of domination, is supported more by what has been called
cultural nationalism, i.e. an ideological discourse according to
which the nation is not so much a political association premised
on modernity’s civic liberties, but a particularistic, ethno-cultural
community of language, religion, tradition, race, habits, with ro-
manticized historical memories (Kohn 1961: 329-330, 457).
Within this national-cultural habitus immigrants have often be-
come ‘otherized’ by Greek nationalist discourse (Grigoriadis
2011), and ‘foreigners’ constitute an imaginary violation of the
nation’s ‘intimate space’ (Tzanelli 2006). The question, never-
theless, is the degree to which these processes occur.
Much theoretical work and research grounded on historical
sociology and social theory accounts was conducted in Greece
during the 1990s stemming from the then revival of the Mace-
donian Question (Demertzis, Papathanassopoulos & Armenakis
1999) and the nationalist upheavals in the Balkans and else-
where. What has been missing since then is systematic empirical
research on national identity so that grand theoretical blue-sky
endeavors are matched with bottom-up evidenced analysis of at-
titudes, beliefs, and sentiments regarding the national habitus
and national-cultural regulations of intimacy (Herzfeld 2005).
For the most part, historical sociological and social psychological
research has been focusing on official nationalist discourse
where one can easily discern the difference between civic and
ethnic nationalism traced in other cases of nationhood as well
(Greenfeld 1992). Scrutinizing official narratives and media dis-
course, i.e. the forensic ideology of Greek nationalism (Φρα-
γκουδάκη & ∆ραγώνα 1997, Frangoudaki & Dragonas 1997, Mil-
las 1991, Özkirimli & Sofos 2008), scholars overlooked the every-
day lived and performed nationhood. They missed, thereafter,
the chance to control from below Anthony Smith’s argument that
every single national identity is not either civic or ethnic/cul-
tural but a special mixture of both orientations (Smith 1991).
Apart from the typical Eurobarometer questions on the re-
spondents’ European and national identity (In the near future
do you see yourself  as Greek only, Greek and European, Euro-
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pean and Greek, European only or Do you ever think of  yourself
as not only Greek but also European? Does this happen often,
sometimes or never? ), and cognate ESS questions in rounds 1
(2002), 4 (2008), and 5 (2010), the admittedly few Greek pub-
lished empirical studies of national identity, in its relation to oth-
er collective identities, rarely refer to the general population (e.g.
Κασιµάτη 2004); rather, they focus on special publics such as
the youth, primary, and upper secondary school teachers, etc.
(∆εµερτζής & Σταυρακάκης 2008, ∆ραγώνα 2007, Στρατουδάκη
2005, 2014). As far as the Greek youth is concerned research
has shown that ethnocentric outlooks stand side by side with rad-
ical political-cultural practices and orientations. With regard to
school teachers, in a rather ill-supported (as far as sample size is
concerned) piece of research, Hara Stratoudaki (2014) purports
to argue that Greek national identity is far from equivocal or
bipolar; on the contrary, she claims that official discourse about
the nation is consistently articulated with diverse political-cul-
tural identities and below-the-line understandings of national his-
tory. Although her research results can hardly be generalized,
the claim that top-down and bottom-up national identifications
are made possible due to a subterranean cultural resemblance
or intimacy without which ‘most nationalisms would have a hard
time keeping popular support’ (Herzfeld 2005: 29) is certainly
plausible. To stress the point further, the issue is not to draw a
dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism but to demon-
strate the multiple ways in which they become articulated in re-
al time and terms. This is partly accomplished in our study,
which includes a battery of items targeted to measure what are
the things that are most important for Greek citizens in order to
consider someone as being truly Greek. 
It should be noted that in this paper we study attributes for
someone to be regarded by the respondents as ‘real’ or ‘true’
Greek. It is critical also to note that it is not easy for empirical
analysis to differentiate between the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’ image
of Greekness. The likelihood is that occasionally they might di-
verge or coincide. This might be uncoupled by using alternative
15POPULISM, ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND XENOPHOBIA IN GREECE
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or even complimentary scales with respect, among others, to na-
tional involvement and varieties of patriotism such as icono-
clastic, symbolic, environmental, and capitalist patriotism (Hur-
witz & Peffley 1999, Huddy, & Khatib 2007).
In the following sections of this paper, we aim to illuminate
questions related to the distinction between right and left-wing
populism and their relation to nationalism. Since the concepts of
nation and national identity play an important role in right-wing
populism, before we move to the indices of right-wing populism,
we study the Greek national identity as perceived by Greek citi-
zens. In particular, we study the characteristics that, according
to the survey participants, separate Greeks from the outside
groups and we build an index of ethnic nationalism. In addition
to that, we create two indices related to populism: One index is
used to capture negative attitudes towards the political elites.
The second is based on items related to a demand for more pow-
er to the poor people. The last index is based on items built to
measure attitudes towards out-groups. 
Data and Methods
In the paper, we use data from the Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study
that followed the elections of September 2015 (ELNES 2015b),
which is part of the Hellenic National Election Studies (http://
elnes.gr). It is a mixed-mode survey conducted by the Laborato-
ry of Applied Political Research at Aristotle University of Thes-
saloniki, using the CSES (http://www.cses.org) module 5 pilot
questionnaire. Most of the items discussed in this paperare thus
included in the final version of the CSES module 5 question-
naire.1 Based on the performance of the previous CSES modules,
we expect that the CSES module 5 questionnaire will be included
IOANNIS ANDREADIS Ξ YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS Ξ NICOLAS DEMERTZIS16
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analysis of the data collected by ELNES 2015b and other five pilot studies of
Ireland, S. Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan. 
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in 30-40 national election studies conducted all over the world.
We hope that the analysis presented in this paper, can be used
as a guideline of how the new CSES items can be used by schol-
ars who are interested in populism, ethnic nationalism, xeno-
phobia and their relationship with voting behavior.
The recruitment of the respondents was done using Random
Digit Dialing (RDD). The web was the main data collection mode
of the survey and the telephone interview was used as an auxil-
iary method.2 Respondents who lacked Internet access and/or
an email account (the respondents were asked to provide their
email address in order to participate in a web survey conducted
by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki) were then asked to an-
swer the questionnaire via a telephone interview. Their number
amounted almost to twenty per cent of the sample. A similar ap-
proach had already been used for the Hellenic (Greek) Voter
Study after the elections of January 2015 (ELNES 2015a) and has
produced a top quality dataset (Andreadis 2015, Andreadis, Kart-
sounidou, & Chatzimallis 2015). The 1068 completed cases were
collected from 16 November 2015 to 29 February 2016. The Hel-
lenic (Greek) Voter Study 2015 included a battery of eight items
(Q04) targeted to measure the attitudes towards political elites.
Some of these items are (either identical to or modified versions
of) statements that have been used previously in order to mea-
sure populist attitudes of both voters (Akkerman et al. 2014) and
elites (Andreadis & Stavrakakis 2017; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, &
Katsambekis 2016). Three out-group attitudes items (Q05) have
also been included in the questionnaire in order to estimate at-
titudes towards out-groups. Finally, there is a battery of seven
items (Q06) where the respondents are asked to indicate how im-
portant is each of them for someone to be considered as ‘real’
Greek. These items are presented in the Appendix as Q04a-
Q04h, Q04a-Q05c, and Q06a-Q06g. In the Appendix, there is al-
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2. The analysis presented in this paper has been replicated in the two
subgroups defined by the mode of data collection (web and telephone); there
are no significant differences for the main findings of the paper.
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so information about the other variables we use in the analysis
presented in this paper.
In order to construct the indices, we apply a series of rele-
vant methods such as Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) and Ex-
ploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). We use EFA instead of Confir-
matory Factor Analysis (CFA) because the batteries of items we
use have not been tested before and we want to explore the fac-
tor structure of each battery. In addition, we use MSA, because
our batteries consist of Likert type items and the methods of Fac-
tor Analysis (both exploratory and confirmatory) which have
been invented for continuous variables, may give more factors
when applied on Likert type data. MSA has been proposed as one
of the alternatives to EFA in order to get the correct number of
factors from Likert type data (Van der Eijk and Rose 2015). Af-
ter finding the variables belonging to each factor/scale, we cre-
ate the corresponding index by calculating the average of these
variables and we transform so that the index gets values in the
interval [0,1].
To study which demographic characteristics affect the de-
velopment of populist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes,
we use linear regression models. In each of these models we have
as dependent variable one of the four indices we have con-
structed and as independent variables, a series of demographic
characteristics. Finally, to study the effect of these indicators on
electoral behavior, we use a multinomial logit regression model.
Construction of  Scales, Research Hypotheses 
and Results
Populist Attitudes Indices
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of variables measuring pop-
ulist attitudes of voters. In order to check whether the eight vari-
ables can be considered as measuring the same feature, we have
performed a series of related checks. First, we reversed Q04a
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and Q04c and stored them as Q04ar and Q04cr respectively.3 We
then calculated Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (both the classic
version and its version for Likert type data) and we found that
the Q04ar and Q04e variables have a very low correlation coef-
ficient with the rest of the variables. The same conclusion re-
sults from the application of Mokken Scale Analysis and Factor
Analysis: Q04ar and Q04e (as well as Q04cr) do not appear to be-
long in any of the factors/scales.
In Table 2 we present the results of Factor Analysis and
Mokken Scale Analysis. The first columns show the factorial
loadings for the first two factors that emerged from the applica-
tion of Factor Analysis. Three variables, Q04b (Most politicians
do not care about the people), Q04d (Politicians is the main prob-
lem in Greece) and Q04g (Most politicians only care about the in-
terests of the rich and powerful) appear with high factorial load-
ings on Factor 1. This is a factor of a negative attitude towards
politicians. Q04f (People, not politicians, should take the most
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3. The first (Q04a: ‘In a democracy, it is important to seek a compromise
between different views’ and the third (Q04c: ‘Most politicians are credible’)
statement have been formulated so as to be opposed to the other statements
and indeed these two questions are negatively correlated with the answers to
the remaining six questions.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Q04a 1045 3.86 0.90 1 5
Q04b 1055 4.01 0.96 1 5
Q04c 1052 2.08 0.97 1 5
Q04d 1050 3.57 1.18 1 5
Q04e 1039 3.06 1.20 1 5
Q04f 1055 3.32 1.12 1 5
Q04g 1050 3.77 1.02 1 5
Q04h 1047 3.61 1.03 1 5
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for items
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important political decisions) and Q04h (Poor people should
have a stronger voice on policy) appear with high factorial load-
ings in Factor 2. Respondents with high values in these variables
believe that greater power must be given to the people.
For the Mokken Scale Analysis, the Automated Item Selec-
tion Procedure (AISP) was applied which separated the variables
into two scales: The variables that were included in each scale
from the Mokken analysis are identical to the variables included
in each Factor from the Factor Analysis, that is, two different
methods classified the variables in exactly the same way, in-
creasing our confidence in the structure of the two factors/scales.
The last two columns of Table 2 show the coefficients Hi of the
variables belonging to each scale.
Based on the results of the analyses presented in Table 2,
we can create two indices: an index (anti-elite) calculating the av-
erage of the three variables belonging to Factor 1 (or Scale 1)
and transforming the index to obtain values in the interval [0,1].
In a similar way, we can create an index (power to the people)
corresponding to Factor 2 (or Scale 2) expressing preferences for
IOANNIS ANDREADIS Ξ YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS Ξ NICOLAS DEMERTZIS20
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Scale 1 Scale 2
Q04ar 0.029 0.261
Q04b 0.640 0.127 0.475
Q04cr 0.350 0.110
Q04d 0.545 -0.085 0.362
Q04e 0.251 -0.222
Q04f 0.212 0.490 0.387
Q04g 0.592 0.354 0.413
Q04h 0.242 0.426 0.387
Table 2. Factor analysis and Mokken Scale Analysis
For Factor analysis, the principal factor method with rotation: orthogonal
varimax (Kaiser off ) was used. For the Mokken scale analysis, the AISP al-
gorithm was used.
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greater political influence of the people, using the two variables
belonging to Factor/Scale 2.
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables
used to assess the attitudes of Greek voters towards out-groups
such as minorities and immigrants. The variable Q05b (Migrants
help the economy of the country) has been reversed (Q05br) to
be in the same direction as the other two variables (i.e. higher
values correspond to more negative attitudes).
Xenophobia index
In Table 4, we present the results of Factor Analysis and Mokken
Scale Analysis for the variables that measure the attitudes towards
other groups. All variables belong to the same factor. Thus, we
can create an index using the average of the Q05a, Q05br and
Q05c variables and transforming the index so that the range of
its values is in the interval [0, 1]. Q05a. Respondents scoring
high on this index are afraid that the Greek way of life and cul-
ture may be harmed by immigrants and minorities, and they do
not think that immigrants are good for the Greek economy. It
seems that these respondents face out-groups with a sense of fear
and insecurity. Thus, we argue that this is index can be used to
measure xenophobia.
Ethnic Nationalism Index
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics of the seven national
identity items. Since value 1 is selected when something is very
important and value 4 is selected when something is not impor-
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Q05a 1049 3.42 1.07 1.00 5.00
Q05br 1051 3.02 1.06 1.00 5.00
Q05c 1052 2.55 1.16 1.00 5.00
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the attitudes towards out-groups
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tant at all, the items that are considered as more important by
most of the respondents will have the smallest mean values. The
smallest mean values are observed for the variables Q06e (to re-
spect the Greek political institutions and laws) and Q06f (to feel
Greek). Their mean values (1.39 and 1.38 respectively) indicate
that most of the respondents believe that both of these attribut-
es are very important in order for someone to be considered as
truly Greek. Indeed, more than 9 out of 10 respondents think
that both of these items are very or fairly important. This means
that most of the Greek respondents follow a short of civic na-
tionalism outlook considering the prerequisites for a non-Greek
to become Greek. On the other hand, the items that are less im-
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Variable Factor 1 Scale 1
Q05a 0.498 0.381
Q05br 0.565 0.410
Q05c 0.688 0.512
Table 4. Factor analysis and Mokken Scale Analysis 
for out-group items
For Factor analysis, the principal factor method was used. For the Mokken
scale analysis, the AISP algorithm was used.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Q06a 1050 2.52 1.02 1 4
Q06b 1053 2.06 0.89 1 4
Q06c 1056 1.72 0.82 1 4
Q06d 1050 2.97 1.10 1 4
Q06e 1053 1.39 0.68 1 4
Q06f 1052 1.38 0.69 1 4
Q06g 1052 2.49 1.04 1 4
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of National Identity items
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portant for most of the respondents are Q06a (to have been born
in Greece), Q06d (to be Christian orthodox), and Q06g (to have
Greek ancestry).
Table 6 displays the output of the factor analysis and
Mokken Scale Analysis on the national identity items. The first
columns show the factorial loadings for the first two factors that
emerged from the application of Factor Analysis. Two elements,
Q06e (Respecting the political institutions and laws of Greece)
and Q06f (Feeling Greek) indicate civic nationalism. These are
the two things that according to most of the respondents are con-
sidered the minimum criteria in order for someone to be truly
Greek. Because of the low volatility of responses (since almost
everyone considers them important) they do not show high fac-
torial loadings on any of the first two factors. On the other hand,
the variables Q06a (Being born in Greece), Q06d (To be Christ-
ian Orthodox) and Q06g (Greek origin) appear with high factor-
ial loadings on Factor 1 (ethnic nationalism). Respondents with
low values in variables belonging to Factor 1 are less tolerant to
deviations from their standards and in order to accept someone
else as Greek they are very demanding and they request com-
mon religion and common ancestry. Finally, Factor 2 includes
the other variables Q06b (to have lived in Greece for most of
their life), Q06c (to be able to speak Greek), but also Q06a. Ac-
cording to the Mokken Scale Analysis4 the variables in Scale 1
and Scale 2, are the same with the variables in Factors 1 and 2
respectively (except for Q06a, since in Mokken Scale Analysis
each variable can belong to only one scale)
Thus, if we want to create an index of ethnic nationalism, we
can do this as follows: a) calculate the average of the three variables
with high loadings on factor 1, b) transform so that the index takes
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4. Mokken Scale Analysis with the usual settings ( lower bound = 0.3)
proposes a single scale that includes all variables except Q06e and Q06f (prob-
ably because Q06a, which belongs to both factors, acts as a link between the
other variables). In order to construct two stronger scales, we have set the low-
er bound = 0.4.
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values in the interval [0, 1], and c) invert the index values so that
higher values indicate stronger ethnic nationalism attitudes.
Discussion
In the following section, we use the constructed indices as de-
pendent variables to identify demographic characteristics and
other factors facilitating populist, nationalistic and xenophobic
attitudes. The studies that have used populist attitudes as de-
pendent variables are limited. Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) have
found that lower levels of educational attainment and current
economic situation (among others) are associated with populist
attitudes. Tsatsanis, Teperoglou and Andreadis (2017) argue that
‘individual-level characteristics that tend to place someone in the
less dynamic and competitive strata of the Greek society will tend
to be associated with populist attitudes’ and they also find that
low-levels of education and income are predictors of populist at-
titudes. As a result, our first task is to verify the association of ed-
ucation and income with our populist attitudes indices (H1). For
our index on ethnic nationalism, since one of the three variables
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Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Scale 1 Scale 2
Q06a 0.419 0.505 0.450
Q06b 0.175 0.652 0.551
Q06c 0.279 0.541 0.551
Q06d 0.615 0.209 0.514
Q06e 0.162 0.309
Q06f 0.307 0.119
Q06g 0.672 0.217 0.532
Table 6. Factor analysis of the national identity items
For Factor analysis, the principal factor method was used with rotation: or-
thogonal varimax (Kaiser off ) was used. For the Mokken scale analysis, the
AISP algorithm with lower bound=0.4 was used.
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of the scale is the requirement to be Christian Orthodox, we ex-
pect that frequent attendance of religious services will be posi-
tively related with ethnic nationalism (H2). This relationship
would be compatible with other studies that find an association
between religious services attendance and ethnic nationalism.
(e.g. Inglehart, 2015: 237)
Finally, we use the constructed indices as independent vari-
ables in a multinomial vote choice model to estimate the impact
of these attitudes on voting behavior. Previous studies have
shown a relationship between populist attitudes and vote for pop-
ulist parties (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014; Elchardus &
Spruyt 2016; Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, & Andreadis 2016).
There are two political parties in the Hellenic Parliament that are
classified as populist by almost all scholars who have published
on populism in Greece (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli & An-
dreadis 2016): The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and
the right-wing Independent Greeks (ANEL). These two parties have
formed a government coalition after the September 2015 par-
liamentary elections in Greece. There are two other parties that
have also been occasionally classified as populist: The Commu-
nist Party of Greece (KKE) and the extreme right party Golden
Dawn (GD), but their classification as populist is not accepted by
everyone. The Hellenic Parliament also include MPs by the right-
wing New Democracy (ND), the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist
Movement (PASOK), the social liberal River (POTAMI) and the
Union of Centrists (EK). 
For our multinomial logit model, we choose ND as the base
category because it constitutes the largest non-populist party and
it will be useful to compare the impact of populist attitudes on the
probability of voting for a populist party (SYRIZA or ANEL) vs vot-
ing for a non-populist party (ND). From this comparison, we ex-
pect to find that populist attitudes increase the probability of vot-
ing for SYRIZA and ANEL (H3). At the same time, it will be useful
to compare the impact of the other two indices (ethnic nationalism
and xenophobic attitudes) on the probability of voting for the pop-
ulist right-wing ANEL vs voting for the mainstream right-wing ND.
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Demographic variables affecting the indices
In this section, we look at possible links of the indices we con-
structed with the personal characteristics of the respondents. In
order to do this, we used the following variables as independent
variables in predictive models of our indicators: Gender, Edu-
cation, Union membership, Family Income, Frequency of Reli-
gious Services Attendance. A full description of these variables
is presented in the Appendix.
In Table 7 five linear regression models are presented. In
each of the four first models we have as dependent variable one
of the four indices we have constructed and as independent vari-
ables a series of demographic features. The first column shows
that the anti-elite index is higher for women and lower for trade
union members. On the other hand, we find that gender is not
an important predictor of the second indicator, which is associ-
ated with demands to increase the political influence of the peo-
ple. It is noteworthy that the influence of trade union member-
ship is in the opposite direction for the two indices linked to
populism. Trade union membership is associated with lower an-
ti-elite index values. On the other hand, it is associated with high-
er values in the popular power index. This finding is compatible
with additional results not presented in this paper due to space
limitations. As Andreadis, Stavrakakis and Demertzis (2016)
show, the anti-elite index is associated with political interest and
political efficacy. More specifically, it seems that there is a mo-
notonous function linking higher anti-elite values with lower po-
litical interest and lower political efficacy, i.e. people who have
been alienated and do not participate in politics should have
higher anti-elite values. Thus, although union members have
higher values in the ‘more power to the people’ index because
this demand is central to their role as union members, consid-
ering that union members are very active in politics, they are ex-
pected to have lower anti-elite values than people who do not
participate in politics. Despite these differences, both populist at-
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titudes indices are lower among people with higher levels of ed-
ucation and income (verifying our H1 hypothesis.)
The third column of Table 7 shows that older respondents,
with lower levels of education and household income, and re-
spondents who attend religious services more frequently, are ex-
pected to have higher values in the ethnic nationalism index, i.e.
these groups are more likely to consider common religion and com-
mon ancestry as prerequisites in order to accept someone else as a
‘true’ Greek. As a result, our H2 hypothesis is verified. The fourth
column shows that respondents with higher levels of education and
family income as well as trade union members are expected to have
lower values in the xenophobia index. On the other hand, older re-
spondents and those more frequently attending religious services
are likely to have higher xenophobia index values.
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Anti-elite Power to
the people
Ethnic na-
tionalism
Xenophobia
Age 0.000 0.000 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 **
Gender(f) 0.040  *** -0.003 -0.016 -0.016 -0.011
Education -0.018  *** -0.023 *** -0.018 *** -0.017 *** -0.011 ***
Union 
membership
-0.048  ** 0.072 *** -0.006 -0.063 *** -0.060 ***
Household 
income
-0.017  *** -0.027 *** -0.022 *** -0.014** -0.006
Religious 
Services 
Attendance
0.005 -0.005 0.071 *** 0.043 *** 0.016 ***
Ethnic 
Nationalism
0.368 ***
Constant 0.768  *** 0.845 *** 0.347 *** 0.473 *** 0.348***
N 926 926 926 928 925
R-squared 0.070 0.063 0.192 0.160 0.347
Table 7. Linear regression models
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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As expected, the index of xenophobia is positively correlated
with the index of ethnic nationalism (r = 0.569) and we can use
the index of ethnic nationalism along with demographic variables
as independent variables in a model with xenophobia index as
the dependent variable. This model is presented in the last col-
umn of Table 7. In this case, age, education and frequency of at-
tending religious services (common predictors for both xenopho -
bia and ethnic nationalism) have lower direct impact on xeno-
phobia because a part of their effect is now mediated through
ethnic nationalism. In this model, the direct impact of income
becomes insignificant, due to the presence of ethnic nationalism
as a predictor variable of xenophobia.
Relations of  indicators with electoral behavior
Table 8 shows the relationship between the four indices with
voting behavior during the Greek parliamentary elections held in
September 2015. The stronger anti-elite attitudes can be found
in four groups of respondents: voters of GD, voters of ANEL, vot-
ers of smaller, other parties and non-voters. A medium anti-elite
index can be found in the groups of SYRIZA, KKE and Union of
Centrists voters. Finally, the voters of PASOK/DIMAR, ND and
POTAMI have the lower mean values on the anti-elite index. The
latter group also has the smallest popular power values, but if
we focus on the largest values of the two indices for populism we
will observe a lot of differences as far as voting behavior is con-
cerned. For instance, KKE voters have one of the largest popular
power scores while their anti-elite score is medium. On the other
hand, people who have decided to abstain have one of the largest
anti-elite scores, but a medium popular power score.
The third column of Table 8 shows the relationship between
the ethnic nationalism index and September 2015 voting be-
havior. The stronger anti-out-group attitudes (mean value 0.68)
can be found in the group of GD voters. The voters of SYRIZA,
KKE, PASOK/DIMAR, and POTAMI have the lowest mean values
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indicating they are much less negative towards out-groups and
thus, arguably, more open and friendly or tolerant towards out-
groups. The fourth column shows the relationship between the
index of xenophobia and the September 2015 electoral behavior.
The strongest (by far) xenophobic attitudes can be found in the
group of GD voters. The voters of SYRIZA, KKE, PASOK/DIMAR
and POTAMI have the lowest average values, indicating they are
more open and friendly or tolerant to ‘Others’. 
A comparison of the ethnic nationalism and xenophobia
mean values between SYRIZA and ANEL voters highlights the
large gap that separates these two groups. The mean values of
ANEL voters for ethnic nationalism is 0.57 and for xenophobia
is 0.56 while for SYRIZA voters the mean values are 0.39 and
0.44, respectively. However, although the voters of the right-wing
populist ANEL score much higher than the voters of the left-wing
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Anti-elite Popular 
power
Ethnic 
Nationalism
Xenophobia
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
SYRIZA 0.70 0.20 0.65 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.44 0.20
ND 0.64 0.21 0.53 0.22 0.54 0.27 0.58 0.19
GD 0.75 0.17 0.72 0.18 0.68 0.28 0.79 0.11
PASOK/
DIMAR
0.61 0.22 0.56 0.21 0.40 0.27 0.44 0.21
KKE 0.71 0.17 0.72 0.17 0.37 0.25 0.42 0.19
POTAMI 0.64 0.20 0.46 0.21 0.35 0.24 0.45 0.18
ANEL 0.78 0.16 0.69 0.20 0.57 0.25 0.56 0.21
UN. OF 
CENTRISTS
0.73 0.18 0.60 0.21 0.53 0.25 0.54 0.13
Other 0.74 0.21 0.79 0.18 0.33 0.31 0.40 0.24
Abstention 0.76 0.18 0.62 0.22 0.47 0.27 0.53 0.22
Missing 0.71 0.19 0.65 0.23 0.46 0.28 0.52 0.21
Total 0.70 0.20 0.62 0.22 0.45 0.28 0.50 0.21
Table 8. Mean values of the indices by voting behavior
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populist SYRIZA, their mean value is less than the mean of GD
voters and, in fact, very similar to the mean values of the voters
of the mainstream centre-right ND.
Finally, we present in Table 9 the impact of the indices on
electoral behavior using a multiple logit regression model. In
this model, apart from the indicators we have constructed, we
use as independent variables the demographic characteristics of
the voters. The reference category is ‘Vote for ND’ (i.e. the coef-
ficients compare the probability of voting for another party with
the probability of voting for ND). A coefficient with a positive
sign indicates an increased probability of selecting the party dis-
played in the column header, while a negative sign indicates an
increased probability of ND preference. In this way, we will be
able to observe more easily the differences between ND and the
other right-wing parties.
In the SYRIZA/ND comparison we observe that women are
more likely to opt for SYRIZA than ND, while larger family in-
comes and more frequent religious services attendance seem to
favor ND. All four indicators we have built seem to play an im-
portant role in the SYRIZA/ND dipole. Higher values in the two
populism indices favor SYRIZA, while higher values in the eth-
nic nationalism and xenophobia indices increase the probabili-
ty of ND choice.
In the GD/ND dipole, an important role is played by age and
income with young people and lower incomes preferring GD.
The anti-elite index does not seem to play a role in this dipole,
while preference for more power to the people favors GD. It is re-
markable that the index of ethnic nationalism is not important.
This is probably because features such as common religion and
common ancestry are considered important elements of ‘true’
Greeks by an important part of ND voters as well. On the other
hand, the index of xenophobia has a significant impact on this
dipole: an increase in its values causes a significant increase in
the probability of selecting GD. This means that while ND and GD
voters do not exhibit huge differences in the ethnic nationalism
index, they differ significantly in how they treat the ‘others’, with
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SYRIZA GD PASOK/
DIMAR
KKE POTAMI
Age -0.002 -0.102*** 0.025** -0.002 0.000
Gender(f ) 0.536 ** -0.917 0.151 0.331 0.448
Education -0.057 -0.162 -0.034 -0.053 0.205 *
Union 
membership
0.492 1.483 0.697 1.535 *** 0.419
Household income -0.300 *** -0.772** -0.062 -0.421 ** -0.030
Religious Services -0.268 *** -0.112 -0.107 -0.454 *** -0.342 ***
Anti-elite 1.535 ** -0.509 -0.306 2.123 ** 1.634 **
Popular power 2.943 *** 4.899 *** 1.485 * 3.975 *** -0.857
Ethnic nationalism -1.042 ** 0.356 -0.924 -1.359 -1.292 **
Xenophobia -3.133 *** 7.375 *** -2.855 *** -3.159 *** -1.654 *
Constant 0.707 -1.723 -0.833 -1.004 -1.037
N 920 920 920 920 920
ANEL UN. OF
CENTRISTS
OTHER ABSTAIN NA
Age -0.019 -0.014 -0.015 -0.035 *** -0.018 *
Gender(f) -0.598 -0.485 -0.308 0.397 0.446 *
Education 0.025 0.173 0.004 0.024 0.058
Union 
membership
0.897 0.766 0.616 -0.233 0.479
Household income -0.192 -0.479 ** -0.391 *** -0.407 *** -0.212 **
Religious Services 0.039 0.245 -0.212 -0.354 *** -0.146
Anti-elite 3.281 *** 2.539 ** 3.144 *** 3.243 *** 0.977
Popular power 3.257 *** 1.600 5.841 *** 1.821 *** 3.573 ***
Ethnic nationalism -0.108 -0.417 -1.998 ** -0.629 -1.401 **
Xenophobia -1.477 -1.815 -3.789 *** -0.914 -0.566
Constant -3.314* -2.715 -1.749 0.105 -1.265
N 920 920 920 920 920
Table 9. Multinomial logit model 
(voting behavior with reference category: Vote for ND)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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ND voters being considerably more receptive and tolerant than
GD voters who together with their leaders, have been engaged in
violent activities against immigrants (Papathanassopoulos, Gi-
annouli, & Andreadis 2017).
In the dipoles of ND with PASOK/DIMAR and POTAMI there
are not many important coefficients. With PASOK/DIMAR the
most important factor is the index of xenophobia that favors ND.
In the dipole with POTAMI, ND is greatly favored by the fre-
quency of religious services attendance. On the other hand, there
is a large number of important coefficients in the ND/KKE di-
pole, a picture similar to that of the ND/SYRIZA dipole, with one
significant difference: union membership, which significantly
increases the probability of choosing KKE.
In the ND/ANEL dipole it is remarkable that the indices of
ethnic nationalism and xenophobia do not play an important role.
The same is true of all the demographic variables we have used
in the model. So, the only driver that leads voters to prefer ANEL
instead of ND is the higher values of the two populism indices
(this finding along with the corresponding finding for the SYRIZA/
ND dipole verify H3). Higher values of the two populism indices
can also lead to other smaller parties or even to abstention.
Conclusion
Against the background of a slowly emerging consensus between
ideational and discursive approaches to populism, this paper has
registered the importance of identifying anti-elitist dichotomies
of an Us/Them type that prioritize popular interests and de-
mands as defining markers of a populist profile. Within this con-
text, and in order to discriminate between different types of pop-
ulism, it becomes equally important to interrogate in detail how
‘the people’ is conceptualized and how the hostile ‘elite’ invoked
in a discourse categorised as populist is defined. 
Our main hypothesis has been that it is possible to empiri-
cally distinguish between left-wing and right-wing populism. In
IOANNIS ANDREADIS Ξ YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS Ξ NICOLAS DEMERTZIS32
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:05:20 |
the first case, it could be assumed that the ‘elite’ would include
both professional politicians as well as the economically privi-
leged, the establishment. As for the people, they would be, ac-
cordingly, framed in a rather ‘inclusionary’ manner that priori-
tizes economic and class positioning over national belonging. In
stark opposition to left-wing populism, right-wing variants would
probably target more the political and not the economic elites,
employing, at the same time, an exclusionary (ethnic nationalist)
understanding of ‘the people’. 
In this paper, we have created four indices based on data
from the Hellenic National Election Study for the September
2015 Greek Parliamentary Elections (ELNES 2015b). Two of the
indices are related to populism – anti-elitism and more power to
the people –, one index was based on ethnic nationalism and it
was used to measure tolerance towards out-groups and a final
xenophobic index was based on items that measure negative at-
titudes towards out-groups. Initially we presented the demo-
graphic characteristics that appear to be related to these indica-
tors. It is remarkable that the educational level plays a role in all
four indicators. Raising the educational level may reduce atti-
tudes related to populism and those related to ethnic nationalism
and xenophobia.
Our data has revealed significant relationships between our
two first indices (anti-elite and popular power) and voting behav-
ior during the Greek Parliamentary elections of September 2015.
As it was to be expected, voters of anti-populist parties like PA-
SOK/DIMAR, ND and POTAMI have the lower mean values on the
anti-elite index. At the antipodes, people who have decided to ab-
stain have one of the largest anti-elite scores (and a medium pop-
ular power score). Strong anti-elite attitudes are also found in vot-
ers of the neo-nazi GD and voters of the right-wing populist party
ANEL. Left-wing populist SYRIZA, communist KKE and Union of
Centrists voters, get a slightly lower score on the anti-elite index.
And how is this people defined? According to a civic or an
ethnic nationalism model? Our dataset reveals that, in fact, left-
wing populist SYRIZA attracts voters more tolerant and open to-
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wards non-Greeks who want to enter the political community;
similar is the situation with the voters of the communist party
and anti-populist centre-left parties. At the other extreme one
finds, once more, the neo-nazi Golden Dawn, whose voters es-
pouse the most radical ethnic nationalist attitudes. The right-
wing populist ANEL is, interestingly, positioned in-between GD
and the first aforementioned group, close to the attitudes of vot-
ers of centre-right New Democracy, something that allows us to
conclude that right-wing populism indeed seems to be signifi-
cantly more exclusionary than left-wing populism, although not
necessarily outright xenophobic. These results are corroborated
by our last index, the xenophobic index.
Even after considering various demographic factors in a
multinomial logit model we find our indices to function as they
were expected. High values of populist indices lead to voting for
populist parties and high values of ethnic nationalism and xeno-
phobia indices lead to voting for conservative parties. Particu-
larly noteworthy is that the indices of ethnic nationalism and
xenophobia have no significant influence on the ND/ANEL di-
pole. As can be seen from the analysis of the data, the only thing
that leads voters to prefer ANEL instead of ND is the increased
values of the two populism indices. On the contrary, the xeno-
phobia index is an important factor in choosing GD rather than
choosing ND (or any of the other parties).
In short, both types of populism (left-wing and right-wing,
inclusionary and exclusionary) are associated with demands for
popular empowerment; and yet, the way ‘the people’ and its oth-
ers are understood by voters are very different. Right-wing pop-
ulism is more anti-elitist and less tolerant towards out-groups. It
seems, then that the indices discussed in this paper can offer us
crucial tools in discriminating between the two and in dispelling
confusion.
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Appendix
The battery Q04 comprised 8 statements and respondents were
asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement by
selecting one of the five options: 1. strongly disagree, 2. disagree,
3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. agree, 5. strongly agree. The state-
ments that have been tested are the following: 
Q04a. In a democracy it is important to seek compromise among
different viewpoints. 
Q04b. Most politicians do not care about the people.
Q04c. Most politicians are trustworthy. 
Q04d. Politicians are the main problem in Greece.
Q04e. Having a strong leader in government is good for Greece
even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.
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Q04f. The people, and not politicians, should make our most im-
portant policy decisions.
Q04g. Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and
powerful.
Q04h. Poor people should have a greater voice in politics.
Q05 Attitudes towards out-groups
Q05a. Minorities should adapt to the Greek way of life, 
Q05b. Immigrants are generally good for the Greek economy, and 
Q05c. Greek culture is generally harmed by immigrants. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with
each statement by selecting one of the five options: 1. strongly dis-
agree, 2. disagree, 3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. agree, 5. strong-
ly agree.
Q06 Some people say that the following things are important for be-
ing truly Greek. Other says they are not important. How important
do you think each of the following is very important, fairly impor-
tant, not very important, or not important at all?
Q06a: to have been born in Greece
Q06b: to have lived in Greece for most of their life
Q06c: to be able to speak the Greek language
Q06d: to be Christian orthodox
Q06e: to respect the Greek political institutions and laws 
Q06f: to feel Greek
Q06g: to have Greek ancestry
D2: Gender (1: male 2: female)
D3: Education: the highest level of education that has been com-
pleted by the respondent according to UNESCO’s 2011 Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 2011). The fol-
lowing codes have been used: 
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0 NO EDUCATION
1 ISCED LEVEL 0 - EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION
2 ISCED LEVEL 1 - PRIMARY
3 ISCED LEVEL 2 - LOWER SECONDARY
4 ISCED LEVEL 3 - UPPER SECONDARY
5 ISCED LEVEL 4 - POST-SECONDARY NON-TERTIARY
6 ISCED LEVEL 5 - SHORT-CYCLE TERTIARY
7 ISCED LEVEL 6 - BACHELOR OR EQUIVALENT
8 ISCED LEVEL 7 - MASTER OR EQUIVALENT
9 ISCED LEVEL 8 - DOCTORAL OR EQUIVALENT 
D5r: Union membership (1. R IS MEMBER OF A UNION, 0. R IS
NOT A MEMBER OF A UNION)
D9: HOUSEHOLD INCOME (the annual income for the respondent’s
household). The following codes have been used:
1 <= 10.000€
2 10.001-15.000€
3 15.001-25.000€
4 25.001-40.000€
5 >=40.001€
D10: RELIGIOUS SERVICES reports the frequency with which the
respondent attends religious services. The following codes have
been used: 
1. NEVER, 
2. ONCE A YEAR, 
3. TWO TO ELEVEN TIMES A YEAR, 
4. ONCE A MONTH, 
5. TWO OR MORE TIMES A MONTH, 
6. ONCE A WEEK/MORE THAN ONCE A WEEK.
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